Groups running numbers as part of the incident response to the El Faro sinking found inconsistencies in cargo data.
Thursday’s session of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation in to the sinking included a member reading an email that was sent from the TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico VP of Operations Jim Wagstaff to the Terminal Manager Ron Rodriguez on October 1.
“Thanks for the information on the El Faro load condition review with Bill. Even though the calculations appear still to be within tolerance, you must ensure the information passed to the vessels is correct. We cannot have these types of mistakes. There are lives at stake, not to mention assets and cargo. Please continue to validate the information, and I will need to see a corrective action plan to ensure this type of mistake does not happen again, and that our current communication is correct,” says the email, as read by CGMBI Technical Advisor Jeff Stettler.
The man mentioned in the email- TOTE Services Port Engineer William Weinbecker- told the Board he didn't actually do any load condition review because that's not part of his job. He was, however, a go-between for a few parties when the problem was uncovered.
Weinbecker says he was involved in the Command Center operations while the fate of El Faro was still uncertain. He suggested they run stability and strength calculations through the American Bureau of Shipping- El Faro's surveyor- as part of their efforts to determine what could be happening with the ship. He got the needed information form Rodriguez, and forwarded it to ABS' Rapid Response Damage Assessment Team.
ABS saw “inconsistencies” in the data, however, specifically with fuel tank loading. Weinbecker got new numbers for ABS so they could run the calculations with the updated information within a few hours. He says he never reviewed the changes from the first to second version, and also wasn’t aware that loading conditions changed after El Faro’s departure.
Further details about the discrepancy were not discussed at this hearing session.
Weinbecker primarily deals with weight, not stability, which is why he wasn't involved in working the calculations themselves. He says he was doing some work relating to the weight changes on board that would happen as part of the pending conversion of the ship to the Alaskan trade route. The major changes- like removing the fructose tanks and certain deck beams- were still being reviewed by engineering at the time of the sinking. There was work underway to add winches, cable, and more to the ship, but previous witnesses have classified those as insignificant weight changes.
Another consistent question through the hearing session has been whether the ship's owner and operator give enough time to ABS to do their survey work and get the Coast Guard involved- which follows guidelines for the El Faro's special inspection protocol called the Alternate Compliance Program. Previous witnesses have said TOTE only gives a few days notice, on average, making it difficult for the Coast Guard to schedule their appearance as well. Weinbecker says any survey he schedules is about a month in advance- although he scheduled for El Faro's sister ship El Yunque, and not for El Faro herself.
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